

Workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good '17 Program

| Time | Event | Authors |
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| 9:00-9:10 | Opening Remarks | Rediet Abebe and Kira Goldner |
| 9:10-9:50 | Invited Talk + Discussion: Good Markets (Really Do) Make Good Neighbors | Scott Duke Kominers |
| 9:50-10:10 | How (Not) to Allocate Affordable Housing | Nick Arnosti and Peng Shi |
| 10:10-10:30 | Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design In The Field | Reshmaan Hussam, Natalia Rigol, and Benjamin Roth |
| 10:30-11:00 | Break | |
| 11:00-11:40 | Invited Talk + Discussion: Making Health Insurance Work through Market Design | Mark Shepard |
| 11:40-11:55 | Truth-Inducing Mechanisms for Medical Surplus Product Allocation | Can Zhang , Atalay Atasu, Turgay Ayer, and Beril Toktay |
| 11:55-12:10 | Opting Into Optimal Matchings | Avrim Blum, Ioannis Caragiannis, Nika Haghtalab , Ariel Procaccia, Eviatar Procaccia, and Rohit Vaish |
| 12:10-12:30 | Analysis of Medicare Pay-for-Performance Contracts | Hamsa Bastani , Mohsen Bayati, Mark Braverman, Ramki Gummadi, and Ramesh Johari |
| 12:30-2:00 | Lunch and Poster Session | |
| 2:00-2:15 | A Personalized BDM Mechanism for Efficient Market Intervention Experiments | Imanol Arrieta Ibarra and Johan Ugander |
| 2:15-2:30 | Mechanism Design with Financially Constrained Agents and Costly Verification | Yunan Li |
| 2:30-2:50 | Assortment Planning in School Choice | Peng Shi |
| 2:50-3:30 | Invited Talk + Discussion: Mechanism Design for Education | Parag Pathak |
| 3:30-4:00 | Break | |
| 4:00-4:30 | Demand Response Contract Design for Energy Markets and Generalizing Demand Response Through Reward Bidding | Hongyao Ma , Reshef Meir, David C Parkes, and Valentin Robu |
| 4:15-4:30 | Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs | Vincent Conitzer , Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill, and Yuqian Li |
| 4:30-5:30 | Panel Discussion Facilitated by: Rediet Abebe and Kira Goldner | Ashish Goel , Carla P. Gomes , Kevin Leyton-Brown , Parag Pathak , and Glen Weyl |

Poster Session

- “A Personalized BDM Mechanism for Efficient Market Intervention Experiments” by Imanol Arrieta Ibarra and Johan Ugander
- “Affirmative Action, Percent Plans, and Segregation’s Impact on Minority Enrollment” by Michelle Jiang
- “Demand Response Contract Design for Energy Markets and Generalizing Demand Response Through Reward Bidding” by Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C Parkes, and Valentin Robu
- “Designing Markets for Altruistic Supply” by Robert Slonim and Carmen Wang
- “Matching with Quantity” by David Delacretaz
- “Mechanism Design with Financially Constrained Agents and Costly Verification” by Yunan Li
- “Near-feasible stable matchings with budget constraints” by Yasushi Kawase and Atsushi Iwasaki
- “Optimization-based Mechanisms for the Course Allocation Problem” by Hoda Atef Yekta and Robert Day
- “Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs” by Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill, and Yuqian Li
- “Truth-Inducing Mechanisms for Medical Surplus Product Allocation” by Can Zhang, Atalay Atasu, Turgay Ayer, and Beril Toktay

Organizing Committee

Workshop Chairs

- Rediet Abebe, Cornell University
- Kira Goldner, University of Washington

Program Committee

- Siddhartha Banerjee, Cornell University
- Mark Braverman, Princeton University
- Nikhil Devanur, Microsoft Research Redmond
- Alon Eden, Tel Aviv University
- Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research New England
- Anna Karlin, University of Washington
- Maximilian Kasy, Harvard University
- Jon Kleinberg, Cornell University
- Irene Lo, Columbia University
- Manish Raghavan, Cornell University
- Samuel Taggart, Northwestern University
- Daniel Waldinger, MIT
- Matt Weinberg, Princeton University